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With the discovery of massive frauds in the Indian and International capital markets,
regulators and legislatures have increasingly turned towards making corporate
governance standards mandatory and have attached penalties to violation of these
‘corporate governance’ ‘guidelines’. This paper questions the necessity for associating
corporate governance in the insider trading context with penal provisions in India. It
makes suggestions for the removal of these penalties and instead let the markets
decide whether to penalise companies which do not have these process oriented
safeguards in place. The paper also recommends introduction of certain substantive




Insider trading is one of the most violent crimes on the faith of fair dealing in a capital
market. The scope and stringency of the violation and penalties differ wildly from country to
country. Trading by an insider of a company in the shares of a company is not per se a
violation of law. For instance a person (an investigative journalist for example may interview
an insider and thus become one) may come across insider information by his perseverance in
uncovering a corporate fraud and disclose the fraud. A person can create inside information
by his future actions, for instance a future tender offer bidder knows that the price of the
target company will go up by his actions. In fact trading by insiders, including directors,3
officers and employees of the company in the shares of their own company is a positive
feature which companies should encourage because it aligns its interests with those of the
insiders. What is prohibited is the trading by an insider in breach of a duty of trust or
confidence in the stock of a company on the basis of non public information to the exclusion
of others.  Insider trading violations may also include "tipping" such information and
securities trading by the person "tipped".
If insider trading is allowed unchecked in the capital markets, persons with insider
information will have a consistent edge in trades executed with such information and those
without the information will be consistent losers on the market. The latter category of people,
which includes the vast majority of investors, would slowly realize the loser game they are
playing in this ‘market for lemons’ and would believe that all transactions are thus biased
against them. Slowly the typical investor would desert the market, retarding or destroying
important functions of the stock market like capital formation.
Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis
In fact in an efficient market, even one share traded on insider trading would violate
the integrity of the markets. According to the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, a buyer of
just one share impacts not merely the counterparty seller, but the entire market. The buyer’s
purchase order drives up demand of the shares and affects all contemporaneous traders on the
sell side of the transaction. The US Supreme Court has used Eugene Fama’s
1 theory of
Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis in Basic v. Levinson
2 to come to the conclusion that the
requirement of reliance in a fraud action in the securities markets is highly diluted
3 because
information is converted into price in today’s anonymous markets
4. Thus anyone who relies
on the price of a security, need not show the common law requirement of reliance in a suit for
damages based on fraud. The court said
“The modern securities markets, literally involving millions of shares changing hands
daily, differ from the face-to-face transactions contemplated by early fraud cases, and
                                                
1 Efficient Capital Markets. Journal of Finance, 25, 383-417
2 108 S.Ct. 978
3 More accurately, the judgment creates a rebuttable presumption of reliance. Thus the onus is on the defendant
to show that in fact the plaintiff thought otherwise.
4 See also “Use of Modern Finance Theory in Securities Fraud Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities”, 38
Bus.Law. 1, 4, n. 9 (1982)4
our understanding of Rule 10b-5's reliance requirement must encompass these
differences.”
In face-to-face transactions, the inquiry into an investor's reliance upon information is
into the subjective pricing of that information by that investor.  With the presence of a
market, the market is interposed between seller and buyer and, ideally, transmits
information to the investor in the processed form of a market price.  Thus the market is
performing a substantial part of the valuation process performed by the investor in a
face-to-face transaction.  The market is acting as the unpaid agent of the investor,
informing him that given all the information available to it, the value of the stock is
worth the market price."
Insider trading, being a species of frauds, has also seen such economic rationale
making inroads into legal theories of damages and injunctive action. In any case the point
being, even one insider violates the integrity of the market and not just the confidence of the
counterparty to his trade.
Levels of prohibition in other countries
There have been several arguments
5 in favour of allowing insider trading for purposes
of efficiency and as a means to reward management and directors of a company.
6 Certain
countries, do not have a prohibition on insider trading. Certain countries, like the US, do not
automatically prohibit trading on the basis of mere possession of inside information. There
must be a fiduciary relationship of the insider with the company before the person can be
sanctioned.
Means of controlling insider trading
Criminal: One way of dealing with insider trading is by passing regulations prohibiting such
trades, making them penal and enforcing criminal actions against violators. As any penal
provision, this is supposed to deter others from violating the regulations. However,
                                                
5 See The economic structure of corporate law, Easterbrook and Fischel, p. 253. This line of theory is generally
espoused by the Chicago school of economics.
6 Other arguments in favour of allowing insider trading are that in light of trading volume insider trading has no
material impact on other investors. Besides it is argued that victims are selected randomly because of the now
faceless market. See. Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market (1966).5
experience has shown us that this method provides only a small amount of relief even in more
heavily regulated countries.
Thus the threat of a jail sentence for the offender under S.24 of the SEBI Act is more
of a paper tiger. Though the jail sentence may look good on the statute, history bears out the
difficulty in enforcing criminal prosecution against an economic offender. The burden of
proof of proving a criminal charge is so onerous, the requirement of intent so strict, and the
courts procedures so long and ‘due’ that conviction is an exceptional exception. For instance
the only case of insider trading prosecuted by Dutch authorities in ten years failed on lack of
proof. The Securities and Exchange Commission of the United States brought 47 cases of
insider trading in the year 2001
7 of which only 4 were referred to the Department of Justice
for criminal action.
With a conviction rate of less than 3% in India, SEBI should really concentrate on
efforts to economically paralyze insider traders instead of the more high profile and far less
successful criminal sanctions. The not so recent action against the directors of Hindustan
Lever Limited is a case in point. Two years after a case in their hands, the regulator is now
getting the case to start criminally.
Civil and administrative penalties: Civil monetary penalties and issue of various
administrative actions like bar from the industry without going to courts is a more effective
remedy and with the enhanced powers granted to the regulator to impose penalties of 25
crores or three times the gain made, an economic harm can more easily be inflicted and
deterrence more effectively administered. Unfortunately the wordings of the civil monetary
penalties are drafted in such a poor manner that, the penalties are certain to be struck down
(or diluted) as unconstitutional
8.
A recent US case is illustrative of a typical civil penalty charged by the Securities and
Exchange Commission. In SEC v. Steve Madden, the Commission filed a settled injunctive
action against shoe designer Steve Madden alleging that he engaged in insider trading. The
complaint alleged that after Madden learned from the criminal authorities that he was the
                                                
7 SEC Annual Report, 2001
8 The penalty provides for the higher of three times the gain made or 25 crores. Effectively, that imposes a
minimum penalty of 25 crores on an insider trader.6
target of a criminal investigation and would be indicted or otherwise charged for securities
fraud, he sold 100,000 shares of common stock in his company, Steven Madden Ltd. Madden
sold this stock without disclosing to the public the information he had learned regarding the
criminal investigation. After Madden was arrested, the company’s stock price sank and
Madden avoided losses of $784,000. Madden consented to an order of permanent injunction
and agreed to disgorge $784,000 of illegally avoided losses, plus prejudgment interest, and to
pay $784,000 in civil penalties.
Prophylactics: The third way of attacking the problem is by encouraging the companies to
practice self regulation and taking prophylactic action. This is inherently connected to the
field of corporate governance. It is a means by which the company signals to the market that
effective self regulation is in place and that investors are safe to invest in their securities. In
addition to prohibiting inappropriate actions (which might not necessarily be prohibited), self
regulation is also considered an effective means of creating shareholder value. Companies
can always regulate their directors/officers beyond what is prohibited by the law.
Corporate Governance
Corporate governance thus is a means of self governance by companies whereby a
company increases its ‘firm value’ by higher and qualitatively superior disclosure as well as
more responsible action. It must be distinguished from regulations which are imposed by the
law and which mandate behaviour at the risk of penalty.
INSIDER TRADING
Definitions
Without getting into the details, let us see briefly, what amounts to insider trading in
India. According to the SEBI regulations on Prohibition of Insider Trading, (“the
Regulations”):
(e) "insider" means any person who, is or was connected with the company or is
deemed to have been connected with the company, and who is reasonably expected to
have access,   connection, to unpublished price sensitive information in respect of
securities of a company, or who has received or has had access to such unpublished
price sensitive information;7
`price sensitive information’ means any information which relates directly or
indirectly to a company and which if published is likely to materially affect the price
of securities of company;
The Prohibition
The express terms of the prohibition as contained in the Regulations is as follows:
3. No insider shall -
(i) either on his own behalf or on behalf of any other person, deal in securities of a
company listed on any stock exchange when in possession of any unpublished price
sensitive information; or
(ii) Communicate, counsel or procure, directly or indirectly, any unpublished
price sensitive information to any person who while in possession of such
unpublished price sensitive information shall not deal in securities.
Provided that nothing contained above shall be applicable to any communication
required in the ordinary course of business or profession or employment or under any
law.
3A. No company shall deal in the securities of another company or associate of that
other company while in possession of any unpublished price sensitive information.
Ingredients of violation
The insider trading law of India is better codified than many of the western countries’
laws, particularly the American law which has primarily been developed by case law and is
quite unsettled in various respects (in part because the American legislature refuses to define
insider trading). The American case law, which nonetheless is highly developed, is based on
the general antifraud provisions of the Securities and Exchange Act
9
For the violation in India, several requirements are made by the regulations. First, the
necessity of being an insider (which now specifically includes a company). Second, the
                                                
9 The ubiquitous Rule 10b-5 of the regulations passed under the Act which prohibits fraud in connection with
the purchase and sale of securities.8
possession of material unpublished price sensitive inside information. And lastly, the factum
of dealing (there is another prohibition against disclosing such information) in securities.
An Insider is any person who by virtue of a duty owed to the company is expected to have (or
has had) access to unpublished price sensitive information. Just by being privy to price
sensitive non public information a person does not ipso facto become an insider. Thus a taxi
driver, who has no connection with the company and overhears two directors discussing
unpublished price sensitive information would not fall under the proscriptions of the Act.
Every person who chances across inside information is not liable under the regulations. The
insider trading regulations are not hypothesized over ‘parity of information’ theory. To draw
an analogy, a person finds a gold coin lying on the road, and appropriates it for his benefit –
would hardly seem a crime punishable as would a fiduciary who is entrusted with a gold coin
and who misappropriates it. A law which penalizes people based on a parity of information
would be unnecessarily unfair and courts must guard against too broad an interpretation of
the regulations.
The possession of material inside information raises the question – what is material
and what is an inside unpublished price sensitive fact. What is material is a question of fact
and will be depend on a balancing of both the indicated probability that the event will occur
and the anticipated magnitude of the event in light of the totality of the company activity.
10
Unusual trading by insiders could be a good indicator of materiality. Inside unpublished price
sensitive fact is inside information which only a select few persons know because of their
closeness to the company and which has not been publicly circulated. When does information
enter the public domain? Probably not for at least a few hours after it is intimated to the
public (via the stock exchange or the company’s website). It is not within the scope of the
paper to discuss what does and what doesn’t constitute insider trading. Instead this paper
focuses on the corporate governance guidelines, discusses their efficacy and questions their
betrothal with the penal and criminal sanctions of the regulations.
GOOD GOVERNANCE
Prophylactics and corporate good governance
                                                
10 TSC Industries v. Northway 426 US 438.9
The 2002 amendments to the Regulations provide extensive suggestions and also
extensive regulations couched in the language of corporate good governance. Most of the
good governance provisions are provided for as mandatory provisions.
Briefly, the good governance regulations provide for:
a) Officer, director and substantial shareholder to disclose their holding on certain events
or at certain intervals.
b) Appointment of a compliance officer.
c) Setting forth policies and procedure to restrict the possibility of abuse of insider
trading.
d) Monitoring and pre-clearance of trades by the designated persons.
e) Restrict trading by such insiders within a certain period of time i.e. before corporate
announcements, buybacks etc. are made.
f) The company has to convey all the significant insider activity and corporate
disclosure in a uniform publicly accessible means to the public – and to the stock
exchange.
g) Chinese walls within a firm to prevent one part of the firm which deals in sensitive
information from going to other parts of the firm which have an inherent conflict of
interest with such other parts.
h) Minimum holding period of securities by insiders.
i) No selective disclosure to analysts. Wide dissemination of information.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act
The US legislature, witness to an unending line of scandals, recently passed  amendments
to the securities/disclosure laws of the country – in effect codifying into law several corporate
governance suggestions previously made. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 requires:
  directors, executive officers and large  shareholders of public issuers to report
transactions in the issuer’s equity securities within two business days of a transaction.
  pre-clearance procedures for transactions in the issuer’s equity securities;
  the responsibilities the company will take for completing filings;
  the requirement (or encouragement) to use a specified broker for transactions in the
issuer’s securities, or the certifications required from brokers if no specific broker is
required;10
  the applicability of the rules to persons with business or family relations to the insider;
and
  sanctions for failure to make timely filings.
We will see in the Indian context several of the good governance regulations for their
relevance and their reason to exist on the statute and further whether they need to be divorced
from the mandatory/penal consequences of the regulations.
A. Officer, director and substantial shareholder to disclose their holding on certain
events or at certain intervals.
There should be some coordination between the requirement of reporting at the 5%
level with the requirements of the takeover code. In fact the takeover reporting is broader in
some respects since it mandates reporting by any person over certain thresholds and also
requires reporting by a group – a concept not introduced in these regulations. However, the
insider trading regulations provide for disclosure of smaller amounts and even provide for
disclosure on selling shares (something which the takeover code does not mandate). It is
suggested that a purchase disclosure made under either regulations (with the same or higher
level of disclosure) should be deemed to be good disclosure under the other. Additionally,
this author suggests the introduction of short swing profits.
Short Swing’ profits: There should be a regulation introduced in the Insider Trading
regulations which compels an insider to disgorge or turn in profits made by insiders to the
company for any transaction in equity based securities in the company’s securities (including
it’s parents or subsidiary’s shares) if both the buy and sell side of the transaction is entered
into within six months of the other.
Such a liability should be imposed without any necessity for guilt or wrongfulness.
This would be a provision which would get automatically attracted as soon as two things are
established. First, the fact of being a designated insider. And second, the fact that the same
securities were bought and sold within six months of each other. Such a regulation would be
relatively easy to administer, since an intent of the person is immaterial. Merely the fact of
the trade is sufficient to take action. Thus the appearance of impropriety is removed from the
markets.
B. Restrict trading by insiders within a certain period of time i.e. before corporate
announcements, buybacks etc. are made.11
Unfortunately, the wordings of the regulations are so broad, that it would chill trading in
sometimes rather large windows. The regulation should not asphyxiate trading by insiders. As
we have seen before trading by insiders and employees aligns their interests with those of the
company and should be encouraged if there is no improper behaviour. Let us study the
restriction for its scope.
3.2 Trading window
3.2.1 The company shall specify a trading period, to be called "Trading
Window", for trading in the company’s securities. The trading window shall
be closed during the time the information referred to in para 3.2.3 is un-
published.
3.2.2 When the trading window is closed, the employees / directors shall not
trade in the company's securities in such period.
3.2.3 The trading window shall be, inter alia, closed at the time of:-
(a) Declaration of Financial results (quarterly, half-yearly and annual)
(b) Declaration of dividends (interim and final)
(c) Issue of securities by way of public/ rights/bonus etc.
(d) Any major expansion plans or execution of new projects
(e) Amalgamation, mergers, takeovers and buy-back
(f) Disposal of whole or substantially whole of the undertaking
(g) Any changes in policies, plans or operations of the company
Issuance of bonus/rights shares has no real effect on the price of the security and
therefore there is no need to have a restricted window for that purpose. (d) to (g) are too
broad and could cause unnecessary problems. To give an example, a company makes a large
gas find, in one grid. It does not want to disclose that fact so that it can buy the neighbouring
grids at a bargain price. It therefore, for a valid business purpose keeps the find a secret for
six months. Even though the directors who know about the find would be expressly
prohibited from trading in the securities under the substantive provisions of the regulations,
all employees (who do not know) too would be barred from trading for six months in the12
shares of the company. This is obviously not an unusual hypothetical. An auto company
comes out with secretive plans for introducing ‘new age’ models almost every month. Such
companies would never allow employees to trade in their shares because there is a closed
window for any ‘execution of new projects’. Let me clarify, that this does not in any way
effect the substantive provisions which restrict insider trading – which of course is prohibited.
C. Pre clearance of trades
Certain provisions are made for clearing of trades if certain officers/employees
engage in shares of their own company. To cite from Schedule I, Part A.
3.3.1 All directors/officers /designated employees of the company who intend to deal
in the securities of the company (above a minimum threshold limit to be decided by
the company) should pre-clear the transactions as per the pre-dealing procedure as
described hereunder.
3.3.2 An application may be made in such form as the company may notify in this
regard, to the Compliance officer indicating the estimated number of securities that
the designated employee/ officer/ director intends to deal in, the details as to the
depository with which he has a security account, the details as to the securities in such
depository mode and such other details as may be required by any rule made by the
company in this behalf.
***
4.1 All directors/officers /designated employees shall execute their order in respect of
securities of the company within one week after the approval of pre-clearance is
given. If the order is not executed within one week after the approval is given the
employee/ director must pre clear the transaction again.
4.2 All directors/officers /designated employees shall hold their investments in
securities for a minimum period of 30 days in order to be considered as being held for
investment purposes. The holding period shall also apply to subscription in the
primary market (IPOs). In the case of IPOs, the holding period would commence
when the securities are actually allotted.13
Once securities are pre-cleared, there is no necessity of prescribing just one week for
the trades to occur. This would expose the employees / officers to unnecessary market risk.
Personal experience from the market seems to suggest that it is not uncommon in large
institutions for officers to get their approval for trading after weeks from the date of
application. Given a one week window to execute their orders would penalize employees
with market timing risk while trading in their own company’s stock. The company should be
free to determine their own methodology and the window permitting execution of trade
should certainly be restrictive regarding the quantity and the time frame should be far less
material.
Regarding 4.2, a suggestion is already made for very senior officers (CEO, CFO, CIO,
Company Secretary etc.) to come under the short swing rule. The other employees should be
subject to a holding period and it should be specified that if they violate the term – they
would need to disgorge any profits made in the period. Even absent mens rea, such a strict
liability would still pass muster in a court of law because it is not truly penal in nature – more
remedial and process oriented.
D. Reporting of ‘process’ to CEO/MD
There is clause which requires the CEO/MD to consider all insider trades and accompanying
documents.
5.3 The Compliance officer shall place before the Managing Director / Chief
Executive Officer or a committee specified by the company, on a monthly basis all
the details of the dealing in the securities by employees / director / officer of the
company and the accompanying documents that such persons had executed under the
pre-dealing procedure as envisaged in this code.
This kind of time for such a routine process by an MD is wasteful and unworkable – it is a
totally unworkable clause for large companies and such micromanagement should not be part
of corporate governance, leave alone regulations. This provision ought to be scrapped.
Other entities having access to inside information
Intermediaries in the capital markets like underwriters, lawyers, auditors are also required to
comply with Part B of the first Schedule. The regulation of these other entities is overworked
and overregulated at times and operationally impossible at other times. For instance having a14
compliance officer who inspects insider trades and grants pre-clearance for trades of
securities of employees is absolutely uncalled for. To give an example practically every law
firm advices listed companies. To have a compliance officer in every firm and monitoring of
trades by each employee is completely unworkable – and even partial compliance will never
happen. The fact that it is coupled with penalties of 10 years in jail, suspension, fines etc.
should create a powerful argument for removal of these ‘corporate governance’ penalties for
non corporates and in particular because adequate remedies are in place for actual insider
trading. Certain other provisions are made for the intermediaries which need to be relooked
at.
E. Confidential Files
“Files containing confidential information shall be kept secure. Computer files must
have adequate security of login and pass word etc.”
To mandate passwords/logins for securing confidential files is nonsensical, to say the least. It
would create workings of entire organizations which are built on sharing information of
confidential files unworkable. To again use the law firm example, if confidential files are not
shared effectively between colleagues, effectively assisting a client may not be possible. It
should be the discretion of the company/firm to bar access to such information as it sees fit.
Such micromanagement should be frowned upon.
OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS
Some possible additions to the regulations
There are a few further provisions the Indian legislature/regulator should consider adding to
the existing framework of regulations to reduce the occurrence of insider trading.
I. Designated or qualified brokers.
To facilitate compliance with the new reporting of transactions, issuers should either
designate a single broker through whom all transactions in issuer stock by insiders must be
completed or require insiders to use only brokers who will agree to the procedures set out by
the company. A designated broker can help ensure compliance with the company’s pre-
clearance procedures and reporting obligations by monitoring all transactions and reporting
them promptly to the issuer. If designating a single broker is not feasible, issuers should
require insiders to obtain a certification from their broker that the broker will:15
•  Verify with the issuer that each transaction entered on behalf of the insider was
precleared; and
•  Report immediately to the issuer the details of each of the insider’s transactions in the
issuer’s securities.
II. Derivatives amendments
Parts of the regulations refer to ‘shares’ for the purpose of proscription while they should
prohibit “securities” trading. For instance, one could, using derivatives, economically sell the
shares without physically trading in those shares.
11 Similarly, one can easily create synthetic
securities with the same economic impact as an equity share of a company. By reclassifying
shares into securities, one can eliminate the problem because securities are defined to include
equity, quasi-equity, derivatives and any combination of the three. Pure debt instruments can
be excluded specifically from the regulations.
Similarly, under Regulation 13 the disclosure requirements should refer to not merely a 5%
stake in the equity but also to a minimum stake in derivatives of the company’s securities.
The minimum can be a rupee amount of the market value of the derivative (since calculating
5% of the derivatives market is neither possible and if possible not meaningful)
III. Civil private cause of action by contemporaneous traders
People trading in the market contemporaneously - not just the regulator or the
counterparties
12 to the insider should also have specific powers to rescind trades and charge
damages to the insiders during the period when they traded. This will provide a broader
remedy and will have many people exerting an economic pressure on the violator to make his
trades unviable.
IV. Proactive Stock Exchanges
The stock exchanges should take up at least a substantial burden of filing action against
persons violating the regulations. Since the Rules and regulations of the stock exchanges are
considered ‘enactment’, and court judgments
13 have found exchange regulations to have the
force of law – they could easily enforce the requirements of the listing terms or the rules and
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regulations by seeking civil action in courts against persons or companies who violate such
regulations. The exchanges should also better coordinate monitoring and surveillance of
listed companies to track unusual activity in the stock of a company across markets for traces
of insider dealings or manipulation.
V. Recission
One author has suggested that a contract of sale or purchase by an insider be declared void by
the counterparty to a trade under the Indian Contract Act (this is besides the powers SEBI has
to annul the trade under Regulation 11). Though legally feasible, it raises impossible burdens
in today’s virtually anonymous capital markets. For instance if an investor had bought 100
shares of the company during the period when the insider trading took place, it would be
difficult to determine the counterparty to the insider. And in any case even if the counterparty
to the trade is identified, the insider has not only hurt his trade counterparty but also the
market as a whole.
14 By buying (or selling) shares the insider would have raised (or lowered)
the price of the shares so bought (or sold) and thus would affect the rights of every person
who bought or sold contemporaneously.
VI. Tippee liability
The regulations prohibit persons from tipping people about inside information by insiders i.e.
the tipper. However, there seems to be no liability for a person who improperly receives a tip
i.e. a tippee from trading. There is a vague prohibition against ‘procurement’ of information.
However, it does not clearly prohibit a tippee from trading.
VII. Bounty system
Section 21A(e) of the American Securities Exchange Act of 1934 authorizes the Securities
and Exchange Commission to award a bounty to a person who provides information leading
to the recovery of a civil penalty from an insider trader, from a person who "tipped"
information to an insider trader, or from a person who directly or indirectly controlled an
insider trader. This could be a useful addition to cracking into new cases of insider activity.
The mystery penal clause
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In the schedule clause 7.1 penalises violation of the regulations and whistle blowing duties of
senior officers. It is not clear whether the ‘corporate governance’ schedule is included in the
duty to report a violation i.e. does it include a procedural violation as well. However, a look
at Section 14 clears all doubts that one can go to jail for 10 years for violating simple or
minor process oriented details.
14. (1) A person who violates provisions of regulation 12 shall be liable for action
under Section 11 or 11 B and/or Section 24 of the Act.
This in a country where the penalty for rape could be as low as 7 years. Maybe, this is
overstating the case, because a minor violation would not really be referred criminally. But
then, why not make the entire Schedule optional. Let companies make a standardized
disclosure in their annual report as to how much of the Schedule they are in compliance with
and what they are not.
Conclusion.
The core of securities regulations is the implementation of the purpose that all investors
should have equal access to the rewards of participation in securities transactions. In other
words all members of the investing public should be subject to identical market risks.
Inequities based upon unequal access to knowledge should not be shrugged off as inevitable
in our way of life. It is therefore important for there to be markets free from all types of fraud
and in particular insider trading which disenchants the common investor from the workings
of the markets as if he is being invited to play a game of crap with loaded dice.
Unfortunately with the unearthing of large frauds, even though India is not unique in this, the
concept of corporate good governance has been lost in the war cry for blood. And as a result,
the government has gotten into overregulation and micromanagement by converting good
governance into statutory provisions. We tend to forget that fraudulent action cannot be
stamped out by micromanagement, it can only be reduced by effective enforcement of the
laws which should prohibit obvious illegalities.
It should not be forgotten that what is sought to be caught is crime and treating all insiders as
inherently tending towards a presumption of unfair dealing should be avoided. Standards of
corporate governance should be left at the helm of the managers of the company. The
regulator should specify in the Schedule to the regulations a list of optional procedure for18
limiting the possibilities of insider trading. What should be mandated instead should be a
statement in the annual report of the degree of compliance with the standards of set forth in
the Schedule. Thus companies which do not follow corporate governance guidelines in
substance would be penalized by its shareholders. An author has also suggested introduction
of corporate governance ratings, similar to debt ratings which would pressure management to
comply with such measures. This could be the missing link providing a simple number which
can be appreciated and understood by the masses and would indicate the processes a
company has put in place for the benefit of their non-insider shareholders.
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